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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal of a decree of divorce is found at Utah Code Anno. 78-
2a-3(h). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The only law Appellee believes to be determinative of any issue in this matter is 
Utah Code Anno. 78-45-7.5 which is included in the Appellee's addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This omnibus divorce was tried to the court for three and one half days. Record at 
1552-54. At the conclusion of the trial the court issued findings, conclusions and a 
decree. Record at 1136-73. The appellant (Mr. Cox) disagreed with the outcome and 
appealed. Record at 1216-17. 
Mrs. Cox believes all findings were supported by the record. The decree was 
supported by the findings. Mr. Cox believes that he should not pay alimony and that the 
property division should be modified. Mrs. Cox believes trial court was very thorough 
and its actions were proper. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
An appellant appealing from a bench trial faces a significant uphill challenge. He 
must obtain the entire record and glean all facts which support the position he opposes in 
order to marshal the facts. He must then show that those facts are insufficient to support 
the trial court's findings and judgment. Here, Mr. Cox has not done that. He failed to 
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have the most critical portion of the record transcribed. He completely failed to marshal 
the evidence. His brief fails to comply with the rules of this court. His appeal must be 
dismissed and plaintiff (Mrs. Cox) should be awarded her attorney fees. 
Before the matter was briefed the Mr. Cox waived his appeal by accepting the 
benefit of the decree which was appealing. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT HAS NOT CONSIDERED THE 
STANDARD ON APPEAL FROM A BENCH TRIAL 
When reviewing a bench trial Utah appellate courts consider the facts from the 
record most favorable to the findings of the trial court. State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 
784 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1998). A trial court's findings of fact should not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard should be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, f 2, 20 P.3d 
332. Appellate courts grant due deference to the trial court's resolution of factual 
disputes. Id at f^ 2, 20 P.3d 332. This rule of appellate analysis is particularly important in 
a case like this where the trial court, sua sponte, specifically called the Mr. Cox a liar and 
found in open court that the Mr. Cox would not be believed and, unless there was other 
independent supporting evidence the court would take "... a jaundice eye at it." [sic] 
Record at 1554, pages 743/13-744/8. The trial court entered specific findings on points 
where it was evident Mr. Cox had lied. Record at 1159-60. 
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APPELLANT DID NOT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY RECORD 
When the entire record of the case is not before an appellate court, it must presume 
the trial court's findings are supported by competent and sufficient evidence. Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In this matter the Mr. Cox obtained the transcript of the three days of trial during 
which testimony was taken and exhibits offered and admitted. Following the trial the 
Mrs. Cox submitted her proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of 
divorce. Mr. Cox objected to many of the proposed findings and to provisions of the 
decree. Record at 1032 & 1061. On January 10, 2002 the trial court heard these 
objection for about three hours. The trial court considered each of Mr. Cox's objections, 
overruled some and sustained others. The minute entry for that hearing is contained in 
the record at 1089. During that hearing the trial court discussed the objections and 
explained the reasons for its rulings; the reasons some findings were rejected or altered 
while others were not. Mr. Cox failed to obtain the transcript of that portion of the trial. 
That portion of the trial record is the more important than all others. That is where the 
court provided its explanation for the points Mr. Cox now challenges. Without that 
portion of the transcript this court must presume that the trial court's findings are 
supported by competent and sufficient evidence. Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
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When reviewing a bench trial, appellate courts may not set aside a trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). To successfully 
demonstrate that a factual finding is clearly erroneous, the appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in favor of the factual finding and show that, even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's factual finding, the favorable evidence is insufficient to 
support that finding. Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, f 17, 20 P.3d 332; State v. Robertson, 
932 P.2d 1219, 1223-24 (Utah 1997). In assessing whether a finding is clearly erroneous, 
reviewing courts must give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
To marshal the evidence the appellant must glean from the record all the favorable 
evidence and argue it at the points in his brief where he challenges each specific factual 
finding. See Tanner, 2001 UT 18 at fflf 18-19; Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (concluding appellant's listing of favorable facts in his facts section 
did not meet marshaling requirement). 
In challenging the trial court's findings here, Mr. Cox has not marshaled any of the 
favorable evidence or even attempted to demonstrate its insufficiency. In light of Mr. 
Cox's failure to marshal the evidence, this court must assume that all the trial court's 
findings are supported by the evidence. See, e.g., Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 
P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998) 
Mr. Cox identified various points on appeal on which he claims the trial court's 
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findings were deficient. Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Cox's failure to marshal the 
evidence his fatal to his appeal Mrs. Cox will show that significant evidence supports 
each point. 
EVIDENCE SHOWS THE PARTIES' STANDARD OF LIVING DURING 
MARRIAGE 
Mr. Cox suggests that the record lacked evidence on the parties standard of living 
during their marriage. He is wrong. At page 240/22 of the transcript, record at 1552, Mrs. 
Cox offered an appraisal of the Sego Lily home which showed the fair market value and 
included photographs of the home in which the parties lived after they were transferred 
back to Utah by the Army. At page 242/14, record at 1552, Mrs. Cox offered an appraisal 
of the Riverton home which showed the fair market value and included photographs of 
the home in which the parties lived until their separation. At page 248/21 of the 
transcript, record at 1552, Mrs. Cox testified of new furniture and a wave runner Mr. Cox 
had purchased. At page 264/18, record at 1553, Mrs. Cox introduced a list of personal 
property the parties had acquired during the marriage. At page 239/11 of the transcript, 
record at 1552, Mrs. Cox testified she should be receiving medical benefits as a result of 
her status as the soon to be former spouse of a military retiree. All of this evidence 
helped the court understand the standard of living the parties had during their marriage. 
The court's findings also show the standard of living. Finding 19 discusses the 
amount of Mr. Cox's retirement. Record at 1139. Findings 23-27 discuss the residences. 
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Record at 1139-40. Findings 46 & 47 are entitled "Standard of Living" and discuss 
family income and assets. Recorc at 1142-43. 
There was evidence which elped the court understand the parties standard of 
living. From that evidence the coi *t entered appropriate and adequate findings of fact. 
EVIDENCE SHOWING APPELLEE'S CURRENT LIFESTYLE 
Mr. Cox complains the trial court did not require that Mrs. Cox show she was 
unable to provide for her own needs and that she can provide for her own needs. That 
evidence was introduced and he mi^  perceives the law. 
At trial Mrs. Cox introduced her financial statement as exhibit 43. That document 
showed her income, assets and expenses. Record at 1552 at transcript 244/1. The court 
made findings on Mrs. Cox's financ.il condition as well. Finding 73 discusses Mrs. 
Cox's income and need for child supoort. Record at 1147. Mrs. Cox's monthly needs, 
from exhibit 43, are found at finding 75. Record at 1147. That Mrs. Cox's needs were 
not being met with in that budget were found at finding 77. Record at 1147. 
Mr. Cox apparently believes that he is the person who is responsible for 
determining Mrs. Cox's needs and thcf she should be able to live on what he wishes to 
give her. Utah courts have held that "an alimony award should, after a marriage . . . and 
to the extent possible, equalize the parlies' respective standards of living and maintain 
them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage.'1 Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); see d\so Jones v. 
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Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. vpp. 1991). In light of this goal, the 
trial court must consider: "(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a su fdent income; and (3) the ability of 
the supporting spouse to provide support." Roberts, h 3 P.2d at 198. 
Findings 78-83 show that the trial court very c a efully did this. Record at 1147-48. 
EVIDENCE SHOWS THE APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO PAY 
Mr. Cox suggests the court received no evide ice as to his ability to pay alimony. 
The second witness Mrs. Cox called was Dr. Kristy vrnsworth. Dr. Farnsworth was 
qualified as an expert witness in vocational rehabilitation, record at 1552, transcript at 
88/15-90/5. Based on the Mr. Cox's work history, ccacation and experience she testified 
that the Mr. Cox was capable of earning between $5( ,000 and $85,000 or $90,000. 
Record at 1552, transcript at 96/8-14. It is signific Xi that the trial court did not adopt Dr. 
Farnsworth's view completely. Instead he found h ai Mr. Cox could earn $42,000.00. 
Dr. Farnsworth further testified that Mr. Cox has t ccn underemployed in his last job, 
record at 1552, transcript 98/9. Mr. Cox's counse: introduced evidence of his military 
retirement and the unemployment benefits he was then receiving. Record at 1554, 
transcript at 555/7-20. All of this evidence established Mr. Cox's ability to pay alimony. 
The court's findings show Mr. Cox's abili > io pay alimony. Findings 29-45 
discuss Mr. Cox's education, training and expensive and the ability to generate income 
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which flows from them. Record at 1140-42. Findings 48-74 show that the parties' 
Laundromat is a revenue producing asset and awarded to Mr. Cox. Record at 1143-47. 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE IMPUTATION OF INCOME 
Mr. Cox complains that the trial court improperly imputed income. At trial Mrs. 
Cox stipulated that income of $7.50 per hour could be imputed to her for 40 hours per 
week though she was not working that many hours at the time. Record at 1153, transcript 
at 339/4-14. Mr. Cox's counsel accepted the stipulation and did not offer other evidence 
to suggest Mrs. Cox's ability to produce income was different than that stipulated. 
This imputation is within the guidelines set by the statute. Utah Code Anno. 78-
45-7.5(2) limits the number of imputed hours to 40. Mrs. Cox testified she was earning 
$7.50 per hour at the time. Record at 1552, transcript at 259/3. The code provides that 
historic income will be used unless there is a finding of voluntary unemployment or 
underemployment. Id at §7.5(a). There was no such evidence or finding for Mrs. Cox. 
The imputation of $7.50 for 40 hours per week was completely within the guidelines. 
Mr. Cox believes his income should have been based on his historic income. The 
trial court rejected that argument as it was allowed to do under the statute. The statute 
requires the use of historic income unless "... a hearing is held and a finding is made that 
the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." Id. That is exactly what 
happened here. At finding 35 the court found that, though unemployed, Mrs. Cox had not 
made serious attempts to seek employment since the beginning of the summer of 2001, 
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four and one half months earlier. Record at 1141. That finding was supported by Mr. 
Cox's own testimony that he had made only one job application per week all summer, the 
one required to receive unemployment. Record at 1552, transcript at 59/21-60/3. 
Based on Dr. Farnsworth's testimony, supra, and Mr. Cox' own testimony, the 
court found Mr. Cox had been voluntarily underemployed and unemployed. See finding 
39. Record at 1142. Because there was evidence to show Mrs. Cox was voluntarily 
unemployed, had been voluntarily under employed and to show the income he was 
capable of earning the court was justified in departing from the statute and in not using 
his historic income. 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 
Mrs. Cox suggests the trial court erred when in "... apparently deciding to give 
Judy virtually all the equity in the Sego Lily home and all the equity in the Riverton 
home." Applt brief at 27. Mrs. Cox fails to describe how this happened. The findings, 
on the other hand, show a conscious attempt by the court to equally divide the parties 
assets. After 15 pages of findings dealing with the parties assets and debt, record at 1139-
54, the findings include a comprehensive spreadsheet showing the allocation of equity 
and debt between the parties with Mr. Cox's account containing approximately 
$107,000.00 more than Mr. Cox's account. That difference is resolved by awarding Mrs. 
Cox a judgment for $53,415.50. Record at 1155. 
Mr. Cox's brief attempts to discuss some aspect of refinancing but, again, he has 
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failed to marshal the evidence on that point. Because he has failed to marshal that 
evidence and because the record does not contain the trial court's description of why it 
did what it did Mr. Cox cannot prevail on this point. 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE DIVISION OF MILITARY RETIREMENT 
Though he does not phrase it this way Mr. Cox's claim is that military retirement 
should have been divided differently by using an earlier date to create the numerator for 
the Woodward formula and that the evidence does not support the date shown. In 
actuality, the official retirement document supports the date used. A collateral document 
suggests another date. The court used the official retirement document. 
At trial exhibit 34 was offered and admitted into evidence. Mr. Cox testified that it 
was his DD Form 214. Record at 1552, transcript at 158/17. As a retired military officer 
he described the DD Form 214 as a document prepared by the military in the normal 
course of its business which is given to departing service people which "... explains all 
the things you did in the military." Record at 1552, transcript at 158/1-15. 
As Mr. Cox was examined by his counsel about his DD Form 214 there was 
considerable discussion about what it showed. Record at 1553, transcript at 386-400. At 
the conclusion of that discussion the court described its understanding of the document 
and its concern that the dates on the DD Form 214 did not coincide with those on another 
military document admitted into evidence as exhibit 63, the Record of Assignments. 
Record at 394/17. 
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Mr. Cox's counsel acknowledged that he had failed to provide any other evidence 
which would substantiate Mr. Cox's position that the Record of Assignments rather than 
the DD Form 214 was correct. Record at 1553, transcript at 394/24-25. Mrs. Cox's 
counsel noted, and the court acknowledged, that Mr. Cox was the person who had access 
to military personnel experts who could have explained the discrepancy but failed to 
produce such a witness. Record at 1553, transcript at 398. Mr. Cox was asked how he 
could tell from the documents that the date shown on exhibit 63 was the beginning date 
for computation of his retirement. He responded "by this document, you can't tell..." 
Record at 1553, transcript at 396/21. When the court admitted the other documents they 
were not received as being authoritative because they were discrepant and the court 
cautioned they may not be given much weight. Record at 1553, transcript at 400/8-21. 
Exhibits 34 and 63 are attached as part of Mrs. Cox's addendum. The relative 
importance of the two documents may be determined from the face of the documents 
themselves. The Record of Assignments is apparently part of a larger document which 
Mr. Cox did not introduce, as seen by the fact that the number "18," apparently a 
paragraph number, appears in the upper left hand comer and the number two, apparently a 
page number appears in the lower right hand comer. Nothing on the face of the document 
authenticates it or shows its use. Mr. Cox did not describe its use at trial other than to say 
it showed where he had been and what he had done while in the Army. Record at 1553 
transcript at 391. There was no substantiated testimony that exhibit 63 had anything to do 
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with Mr. Cox's retirement. 
Exhibit 34 is different. It provides, at the top, "this is an important record. 
Safeguard it" and "any alterations in shaded areas render form void." It further provides, 
at paragraph 18, "Data herein subject to computer matching within DOD or with other 
agencies for verification purposes and determining eligibility or compliance with federal 
benefits." I.e. it shows on its face it pertains to retirement. Paragraph 23 also shows it 
pertains to Mr. Cox's retirement. It is a personnel document. See paragraph 22. 
The DD Form 214 shows, at Tf 12(a), that Mr. Cox entered the military "this period" 
on December 10, 1968. It shows, at f^ 12(c), net active service which matches the entering 
date shown in f 12(a). The trial court used these two matching dates in making findings 
13, 14 and 17. Record at 1138. The trial court did not use the date in exhibit 63, the 
Record of Assignments, presumably because the DD Form 214 was an official retirement 
record and the other was not. 
Though the year since the hearing has dimmed his memory, it is the undersigned's 
recollection that this issue was discussed in detail in the hearing of Mr. Cox's objections 
on January 10, 2002. Unfortunately, since that hearing's transcript is not part of the 
record we do not have the benefit of the trial court's reasoning. 
APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL 
This matter appeals the Decree of Divorce entered by the trial court on January 22, 
2002, Record at 1164. The Decree, at paragraph 15, awarded the Mr. Cox certain real 
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property in Riverton, Utah. On May 26, 2002, pursuant to paragraph 27 of the Decree, 
Mrs. Cox executed a quit claim deed to the Riverton Property, a copy is attached. That 
deed was provided to Mr. Cox' counsel. On June 20, 2002 Mr. Cox recorded that quit 
claim deed. The quit claim deed shows on its face that it was issued "pursuant to a decree 
of divorce." 
The Decree of Divorce also provided, at paragraph 14 that Mrs. Cox was awarded 
certain property located in Sandy, Utah. On April 25, 2002, Mr. Cox executed a quit 
claim deed to the Sandy property for Mrs. Cox, copy attached. That quit claim deed also 
shows on its face that it was issued pursuant to a decree of divorce. 
Utah law is both old and continuing that when one accepts the benefit of a 
judgment he may not thereafter continue an appeal from that judgment. Ottenheimer v. 
Mountain States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 193, 188 P. 1117, 1118 (1920); Hollingsworth 
v. Farmers Insurance Co., 655 P.2d 637 (Utah 1982); Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, (Utah 
1987); Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Estate of Husband v. Husband, 888 P.2d 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The cases explain the breadth of the rule. In Ottenheimer the appealing party was 
awarded a money judgment and possession of real property. After the appeal was filed the 
appellant vacated the property but, apparently, did not collect the money judgment. Trees, 
at 613, states the rule "... one who accepts benefit under a judgment is estopped from later 
attacking the judgment on appeal, and one who acquiesces in a judgment cannot later 
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attack it." The waiver arises from the acceptance of A benefit, not THE benefit. The 
rule is that an appellant need not accept the entire benefit of the judgment. Accepting a 
partial benefit is sufficient to invoke the rule. 
There is a minor exception to the acceptance of the benefit rule which is given lip 
service in some cases but is not generally applied. In Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 
P.2d 1142 (1973) the court described an exception where there are independent claims 
within the judgment. This exception does not apply here. Paragraph 15 of the Decree of 
Divorce notes that the Mr. Cox' interest in the property is subject to a judgment lien of 
$53,415.50. Record at 1169. Paragraphs 126 and 127 of the Findings of Fact shows that 
this figure is the net result of calculating the parties relative equity in all of the marital 
assets. Record at 1154-55. These paragraphs also show that the parties equity in their 
respective residences is factored into the $53,415.50 lump sum. Finding 128 shows that 
this sum, associated with the residence, is in the nature of alimony and support. Record at 
1155. The award of the residences and the allocation of their equity is inextricably 
intertwined with all of the other aspects of the judgment. It is not an independent claim 
and not subject to the rule of Jensen. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IGNORES THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
PRESERVATION FOR APPEAL. 
Rule 24(a)(5) Utah R. App. P., requires that an appellant cite to the record his 
attempts to preserve issues before trial court. This rule flows from the principle that it is 
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necessary to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any errors before the matter is 
taken on appeal. R.T. Nielson v. Cook, 2002 UT 11112, 40 P.3d 1119. Mr. Cox has not 
cited any place in the record where any of his issues were preserved. 
REFERENCES TO THE RECORD. 
Rule 24(a)(7) Utah R. App. P., requires that an appellant refer to the record when 
citing "facts" in his brief. Though there are a handful of citations to the transcript there 
are literally no citations to the record in Mr. Cox's brief. The citations to the transcript 
deal almost exclusively with the DD Form 214 issue which deals with the interpretation 
of a document and not with some factual contention. This deficiency is in the face of the 
fact that the appeal is from a bench trial and Mr. Cox is required to cite to the record as he 
marshals his evidence and the fact that he failed to provide the complete record. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Though Mr. Cox is pro se it is apparent that this matter falls within the purview of 
Rule 24(j) Utah R. App. P. and that an award of attorney fees is appropriate. Mr. Cox's 
brief is like that described by this court in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). "While numerous issues are raised on appeal, appellant's brief has not 
been of much help to the court in disposing of the case before it." at 960. 
The result of Mr. Cox's failure to comply with Rule 24, his failure to marshal the 
evidence and his failure to obtain the entire record is that his appeal was doomed from 
before the time his brief was filed. Still, Mrs. Cox has been required to go through the 
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exercise of preparing her own brief to rebut Mr. Cox's undocumented assertions. This 
has been a significant financial burden which she should not be required to bear. 
The record below shows that Mr. Cox's attempts at pro se representation have had 
the effect of shifting the financial burden to the Mrs. Cox in the past as well. The record, 
at 361-393, shows that the parties agreed to mediate. Mr. Cox appeared without counsel 
at the mediation which then took three sessions totaling 15 hours. At the conclusion of 
the mediation a mediation agreement was signed which Mr. Cox then refused to honor. 
The result was that Mrs. Cox incurred attorney fees for 15 hours of her attorney's time in 
addition to fees for the mediator. Had Mrs. Cox had counsel the mediation would have 
either broken down in the first session or it would have resolved. Mrs. Cox bore the 
financial brunt of Mr. Cox's pro se representation there as well. 
Now Mr. Cox is again pro se. His brief is legally insufficient but Mrs. Cox must 
respond. She should not be required to bear that cost. The court should award Mrs. Cox 
her attorney fees incurred because of the deficiencies in Mr. Cox's lawyering. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal should be dismissed and the Mrs. Cox awarded her attorney fees. 
Dated this / X day o f ^ ^ ^ 2002. 
Robert H. WildeN 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Anno. 78-45-7.5 
Exhibit 34 
Exhibit 63 
Quit Claim Deed to Riverton Property 
Quit Claim Deed to Sego Lily Property 
Trial Transcript pages 88-96, 157, 386-400 
Delivery Certificate 
I hereby certify that a two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE was mailed to the following via first class mail, postage prepaid thereon, this 
/ y day of December 2002. 
Larry Cox 
2195 West 13250 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
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ADDENDUM 
Document 1 of 1 
Source: 
Utah Primary Law/Utah Code Annotated 1953/TITLE 78 JUDICIAL CODE/PART 4 PARTICULAR 
PROCEEDINGS/CHAPTER 45 UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT/78-45-7.5. Determination of 
gross income - Imputed income. 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income - Imputed income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3); 
and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, 
dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, 
capital gains, social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, 
income replacement disability insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government 
programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. 
However, if and only if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent normally and 
consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 3 5A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, 
Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or 
General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by 
subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. 
The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. 
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted 
from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business income 
determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then 
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date 
pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year 
unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records 
maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer 
statements, and income tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or 
overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, 
the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and 
probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for 
persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same 
occupation in the same geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a 
judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings 
of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount of 
income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the 
home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject of a child 
support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security 
Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as 
child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against the 
potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a 
parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. 1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, ch. 118, § 
7; 1996, ch. 171, § 1; 1997, ch. 29, § 1; 1997, ch. 174, § 68; 1997, ch. 375, § 322; 1998, ch. 53, § 3; 
2000, ch. 161, § 30; 2001, ch. 116, § 203. 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority for the 
following administrative rule(s): R527-601. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection (5)(b). 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added "40-hour" and the second sentence in Subsection (2). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 29, effective May 5, 1997, substituted "shall" for "may" in Subsection (8)(b 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 174, effective July 1, 1997, rewrote Subsection (3)(a) which read V id to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)" and substituted "Supplemental Security Income, Social Security 
Disability Insurance" for "S.S.I." in Subsection (3)(b). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Department of Workforce Service " for 
"Office of Employment Security" in Subsection (5)(b). 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "minor" before "child" twice in Subsection (8)(a). 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "the party defaults, or, in contested cases" for "c " in 
Subsection (7)(a); added the language beginning with "or the median earning" in Subsection (7)(b); and addec "or 
their occupation is unknown" in Subsection (7)(c). 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added "income replacement" before "disability insurance 
benefits" in Subsection (1)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Deductible^ expenses. 
Findings by court. 
Imputed, income^ 
Modification of award. 
Secondjob. 
Self-employment. 
Social Security benefits. 
Cited. 
Deductible expenses. 
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt with as a matter of law under this section; the deductibility ; f 
particular expenses poses a question of fact, turning on whether such expenses are necessary, and, if so, 
whether they exceed those required for the business's operation at a reasonable level. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 
P.2d1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The trial court acted within its discretion in not deducting as "necessary expenses required for self-
employment of business operation" the father's small business taxes and his student loan obligations in 
calculating his gross income. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 
(Utah 1995). 
Court properly allowed only half of father's claimed expenses for education, travel, and entertainment 
deductions because the claimed expenses significantly benefited the father and were double the amount 
reasonably necessary to allow his business to operate at a reasonable level. Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Findings by court. 
^ ough a trial court entered findings required by Subsection (7)(b), since the trial court failed to enter any 
find! ic > required under Subsection (7)(a), the findings on the whole were insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
(Uta i ::t. App. 1993). 
imputed income. 
£,en though the court's findings of fact did not include a specific finding that ex-husband was underemployed, 
be- i. -e he had acquiesced to the imputation of income at the trial level and because his job history and current 
en l« 'ment options inarguably supported this imputation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing 
inc r nn an amount greater than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
J .bsection (7)(c), by its terms, applies only when a parent has no recent work history Reese v. Reese, 1999 
U" 7 984 P 2d 987 
tiere the plaintiff did not assert that she was unqualified to receive at least the lower of two standard wages 
or tt i t her work for the school district was so specialized that her qualifications could not transfer to other 
cc i4 xts, and where there was no indication that the trial court's imputed salary diverged from the prevailing 
w g s for persons with the plaintiffs background and qualifications, there was no error in the court's finding that 
sY * /as underemployed. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT75, 984 P.2d 987. 
' \/here the only testimony that the plaintiff presented as to an unusual need for her to stay at home related to 
aerations that the defendant had abused one of her daughters from a former relationship, and where the parties 
v. H now divorced, with the defendant having only supervised visitation, there was no basis for reversing the trial 
c i s imputation of the plaintiffs income. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987. 
f
 was proper to impute income to the father because the pursuit of a bachelor's degree is not "career or 
c x pational training to establish basic job skills" under Subsection (7)(d)(iii). Mancil v. Smith, 2000 UT App 378, 
3 3d 509. 
Modification of award. 
When the parties had agreed to the amount of child support before the effective date of the child support 
i elines, the trial court erred in modifying child support when no petition to modify had been filed and in 
n iifying the support amount without finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred since the 
)t Aous order had been entered. Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(1) 
i: orior to 1990 amendment regarding impact of guidelines on existing support orders). 
Second job. 
The trial court's decision to consider the father's second source of income as part of his primary job was 
supported by the fact that both sources involved the performance of his professional duties as a physician. 
Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
Self-employment. 
Court properly calculated father's income under § 78-45-7.5(4)(a) rather than under the 40-hour work week 
quirements of § 78^45_-7J5(2J because father was a self-employed anesthesiologist, a highly compensated 
ofession whose members customarily work more than 40 hours a week. Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757 
JtahCt. App. 1998). 
Social Security benefits. 
A trial court may, in its discretion, consider a child's receipt of Social Security benefits against the parent's 
:hild support obligation. However, a trial court may not order that those Social Security benefits be subject to legal 
process. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In a proceeding on a petition by the guardian and conservator for a child, appointed following the death of the 
custodial parent, the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to offset Social Security benefits paid to the 
child on the basis of the child's deceased mother's earning record. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
Social Security benefits made to minor children as a result of obligor parent's disability may be credited 
toward that parent's ongoing child support obligation. Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Social Security benefit amounts paid to minor children, which exceed the court-ordered child support for the 
same period, may not be credited toward previously accrued child support arrearages. Coulon v. Coulon, 915 
PJ2_dJ069 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Attributing undisclosed income to parent or spouse for purposes of making child or spousal support 
award, 70 A.LFUth 173. 
Basis for imputing income for purpose of determining child support where obligor spouse is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed, 76 A.L.R.5th 191. 
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Judy Cox, Grantor, of Sandy City, County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to Larry Cox 2195 West 13250 South, 
Riverton, Utah 84065, Grantee, of Riverton, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, pursuant to a decree of divorce, the following 
described tract of land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
All lot 1C Hamilton Acres No. 2, ^ £ /JJU^Ud-
yr\ i*^ 
subdivision according to the official plat 
thereof on file in the office of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder 
Tax ID No. 27-33-478-015 
WITNESS the hand of said Grantor, this JlJrfij day of 
. A.D. Two Thousand Two. 
Jud^JSox/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the day of -V , 2002 personally appeared 
before me Judy Cox, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who 
duly acknowledge to me that she executed the same. 
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Larry Cox, Grantor, of Sandy City, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to Judy Cox 2202 East Sego 
Lily Drive, Sandy, Utah 84092 Grantee, of Sandy City, County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, pursuant to a decree of divorce, the. 
following described tract of land in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah: 
All of lot 513 ParK Crest No. 5 subdivision 
according to the official piac thereof on 
file in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder ^ 
.5HS- t^> ^-< 
WITNESS the hand of said Grantor, this 
fifflJU , A.D. Two Thousand Two. 
ZS~ 
Larry Q26 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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the same 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Brothers 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
time. 
How many hours a week did you put in there? 
Oh, two to three hours a day during the week. 
Now, you referenced your termination with Lewis 
because of the INF treaty, correct? 
That's correct. 
And you spoke about the STARK treaty, correct? 
That's correct. 
Was there supposed to be any break in employment 
if the STARK treaty would have been taken over by Lewis 
Brothers 
A. 
P 
No. That was supposed to just carry over to the 
STARK treaty. And we thought it was going to and we were 
all disappointed when it didn't. 
Q. 
were lai< 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Judge. 
you. 
Were there other individuals besides yourself who 
d off or terminated by Lewis Brothers? 
Everybody was terminated. 
How many? 
Thirty-five. 
MR. FRIEL: No further questions on this issue, 
THE COURT: Appreciate that, Mr. Friel. Thank 
Do you want to call your next witness? 
MR. WILDE: I do. 
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THE C'JlJH'l li-inL you. 
Thank you, Mr, Cox. You can take a seat at 
counsel table, 
Ms, Farnsworth come forward and be sworn, please. 
KRISTY FARNSWORTH, 
c a 11 € d a s a \ /:i t:i le s s ] : •} 11 ie j: ] a :I nt i f f, 
having been duly sworn, was examined r;n.. 
testified on her oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILDE: 
Would vou t'rjll nr v i irrif- mil riiiliess, please, 
l.risty Farnswoith, My Business address is 9557 
South 70 0 East in Sandy. 
U Hi l' I \ N i " I I II,1-. vh.-n ;; ou dij 1 or d living? 
ni a rehabilitation specialist. 
w. r»ould you tell us what a rf-hnhi ] i |- .-ftt. i on j-.peci a 11.-.L: 
1 n ? 
A A rehab specialist works with individuals to 
deve 1 op retur i i to • \ /o:r ] ;: p] a i is I \ : :i : k \ :i t:I: :i :i nr i i ' i JUa L i Hi 31 
may have some t y p e of i n j u r y on t h e j o b t o h e l p them f ind a 
jul), ijij j o b p l a c e m e n t w i th emp loye r s I d e v e l o p plans: f i 
'pe i i '^ l t-] ^-yi^ m ,] i .. i iu .j'ljh t o I le lp t lie p e r ^ n 
recover from an injury so that they can go back to work. 
Those types of thinqs. 
i i J , ^ u ciesciibe tor us your education, training 
and experience that allows you to do that. 
A. Yes. I have a bachelor's degree in independent 
studies from BYU, a master's degree in educational 
psychology with --in rehabilitation counseling from the 
University of Utah, and a Ph.D. in human development from 
the Fielding Institute, and post-doctoral studies in neuro-
psychology. And I have several certifications in my field 
of rehabilitation, including certified rehabilitation 
counselor, certified disability management specialist, and a 
certified vocational evaluator. 
Q. Have you testified as an expert witness in court 
before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Describe for us the courts. 
A. Well, I've testified in this district and also at 
the federal level, and in administrative hearings. 
Q. Describe the administrative hearings, the classes 
of administrative hearings, if you will. 
A. Administrative hearings at the office of Hearings 
and Appeals with Social Security Administration, where 
individuals are applying for social security disability, I'm 
an impartial expert to answer questions from the judge. 
And administrative hearings in the State Insurance 
Fund and Worker's Compensation. 
Q. As part of the work that you do, does it include 
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determining, based upon people's experience and education 
and prior shown skills, the ranges in which they might be 
employed, the income you might expect based upon their 
history? 
Y :, , do that routinely. 
I i i h i ' * II K ^ m i i i I MI J i ^ p - i r a t . 1 n £ : ] : o : i mi ng 
here to talk with us today? 
A T looked at the information that Mr. Cox 
subiiii U.t- ' M ink , ,jv^ih deiyL" _tj_. MCSL _ L the exhibits 
Mia! were discussed earlier at this hearing. 
And did you also have the opportunity t review 
h i . ['.'position t 
1 didn't: look at his deposition. 
in ii i i iqnt fiM , r.nd , : tJ lat < • :: uld ii iclude 
the applications he's made, the information on his degree, 
In r? - i V v-i th the Army? 
.. jri«-o, . .~h ±Li,d the applications for 
employment and the certificates regarding the commendations 
he received while m the mi I it: ar} r 
I UL 11 LS hxluLi L lb ? 
This is ]ust a summary :;f the types of jobs and 
he c -i"1 n • i P•"•-! i 11 11 I i M I i I \ i i i J I i . 11 i u u l s w i I,.h 
qualifications, education and experience similar to 
Mr. Cox's. 
I II I • 1 1 ! IEI ! ! • : i .i I I : „, : :i , the w i t n e s s h e r e h a s not 
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been qual 
witness, 
.ified as an expert. If I may voir dire the 
please. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. FRIEL: Thank you. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FRIEL: 
Q. Dr. Farnsworth, are you associated with a group 
other individuals with your same" expertise? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
And who is that? 
The International Association of Rehabilitation 
Professionals, the Case Management Society of America, 
National 
Q. 
Academy of Neuropsychologists. 
You had mentioned that you've qualified as an 
expert in the Third District Court before? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And in front of which judges? 
Probably all of them. 
Has there ever been a time that you have not 
qualified as a judge [sic]? 
A. 
Q. 
you were 
A. 
probably 
Never. 
How long ago did you -- when was the first time 
qualified as an expert witness? 
Ifm not exactly sure, but I would estimate it 
was around 1985 or 1986. 
MR. FRIEL: No further questions, Judge, 
THE COURTi Thank yoi i, 
MR \ JII iDE W of fe i: ] ; , / 1 i : 1 :i s D. 1 F ax: i is i uoi t:J: ' s 
resume. 
THE COURT; ^ny o b j e c t i o n s t o 17? 
I II > I ri i i r i i ollered as-1: ' I !m sorry I 
1' lnf t hear that. 
THE COURT 
MR. VJILDh: in 's nei resume offered as 
illustrative of her testimony. 
MF VV T'M'I I 11 tj ) e> 'i J < 'i i;JI ' 'i i i m a t . 
THE COURT ; 1 / '" ,:: i n 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed) 
W WIT.DN: 
I,I Biased upon your examination of the documents we 
rovided, did you also listen h > , n t LIIII I J ^  in 
:curt earlier this morning? 
i d id hear that. ' : 
^g j ii |i. 1p > fu] m L i j, i I^I.J,. i 1,,-iL J-'iil" v^ >.^nsidered and 
«o 'examined, what's your expert opinion as to the range of 
income which Mr, Cox coul d earn based upon his experience, 
p e i t :i s e , e di :i c a t i : i i c . *J ? 
03 . ' y 1 ink that a conservative estimate of his 
^arninq capacity r:qhf nrw : : • I(MIM 
u.juld go up iiuin there, depending on 1: low well he 
performed and applied himself in the job. 
Q. Now, you've heard him indicate that he's been 
looking for a job during the summer and has not found 
anything even in the range of nine or $10 an hour. Based on 
your review of the documents which he's provided, can you 
enlighten us on why that might be, that he hasn't found a 
job? 
A. Well, I think there are a number of reasons. But, 
primarily, I think that when an individual is looking for a 
job, they have to have a certain goal in mind and really 
direct their energies towards that goal. Complete and 
accurate description of a person's skills and abilities on 
an application is really important. And an application 
needs to be very neatly and professionally completed. 
And I think that a person whose really looking for 
a job needs to focus their responses on applications to the 
job that they're looking for. 
Q. Would you tell us what Exhibit 18 is? 
A. This is just a summary of the research that I did 
related to employment opportunities for individuals who have 
education and experience similar to Mr. Cox's. 
Q. And in which of these categories do you think 
Mr. Cox would fall with the ones that are listed on Exhibit 
18? 
A. I think that any of the job titles listed under 
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Occupational Reports would be could be considered job 
goals for Mr. Cox. Any of the job titles under the Labor 
?4ark> t r npor-uii ^ect imi vou I I .' ] • " I < ] i I. ;;i J-I 1 ,ri. 
The National Salary Surveys section are really 
more general, but any type of management position :culd a 1 ,~M 
IP f''i.md Uriels I UI^M.-' jinl W'juld aloj be appropriate tor 
Mr. Cox. 
The Col lege Placement Coi inc :i 1 Salary Si ir * e^ , 1 
have on there the salaries offered for persons who graduated 
with an MBA, 1 ' m not su.i e that he has an MBA, but he does 
have a mastery- degree in management \.)\v \ ' i juniiip him 
to apply for the jobs stated earlier in this summary. S J I 
would probably eliminate those that: say MBA non-terhn ~ 
b e c a 1.1 s«• I " 11 \ 11 > >: \r > u t" i L i v e L1 l a I he lias t hi a t . 
But, clearly, financial manager is similar to the 
type of training that 1>> Pari 'Vni ^ v TI 'I in vei L. J L , t 
itah graduates summaiy identifies persons that have a 
bachelor of science in business administration ranqe- H i p 
CwUJ 1 i i, i i MII lntJt Minn '-h.l I h n I lie sample ci c u n e n t 
i.: listings were just a few that 1 pulled off of the 
%-ebsite. And I think that those also would be job an-iltf f> r 
u • 
MR, WILDE; Offer 18 as illustrative of her 
-estimony. 
I IR FRIEL: No objection. 
!:  :!: 
THE COURT: So although there were no objections 
and it's going to be received, can you help me out, 
Dr. Farnsworth, as to where you got the occupational 
reports, where you got the labor market --
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- tell me the sources, please. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. The attachments on the --
included on this Exhibit 18 are copies of the information. 
And the information comes from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and I just accessed that through the America Job 
Bank. 
THE COURT: Okay. So the front page of P-18 is a 
compilation of a summary of what is contained, and reference 
to where you received that information are the rest of 
these --
THE WITNESS: Exactly, yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. P-18 is in. 
Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Wilde) So would it be fair to say that 
you're familiar with employment potential and probable 
earnings as derived from work history, occupation 
qualifications and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in this community and the median 
earnings for persons in the same occupation and the same 
geographic area as maintained by the Bureau of Labor 
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tj L a L 1 3 11 C 8 .^  
Right. 
^ And so if Mr. ^zx w - " - n 
appropriate resume and submit appropriate -- appropriately 
drafted applications, and your testimony is that his 
f ,:J M M M : . i La] : ; ) > mi I i -il' nl ,")i 11? 
Fifty. J think that's very conservative. 
i i MI I i i in I here go up tu what, 
IJi-JI Lt would really depend on how he would appl \ ; 
h i m s e l f . B u t i f a n i n d i v i d u a I i I i n in i ::il :i ::i tl :i = • j : 1: a LI i i 
M->u I,now, worked at it r-ould probably go up to even eighty 
tive, ninety, depending on hov* much Lliu individual is 
', i i I i i i i I i 11 i l i i i l 111 11 I ^ . 
MR. WXLDhi Uo further questions. 
THE COURT • xhank yoi i. 
r i 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MP, FRIEL: 
li JJ, . F 'arnswortb , l o o k i n g a t t h e , I b e l i e v e , E x h i b i t 
18, which, t a l k s abou t s a l a r i e s . 
i A , V J i , 
ii >A iiuw nave you broken this down as far as 
geographical location? What does this tell us as fa ; : a = c 
'jeogi aphiijdl 1 ^ dUi>ij . i where these salaries could be 
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-I obtained? 
2 A. They're all in the state of Utah except those that 
3 are noted under the National Salaries Surveys. 
4 Q. Okay. And tell me the age, how you project in 
5 here the age of the person that you're looking at. Does age 
6 have anything to do with these projected salaries? 
7 A. The age is not reflected in the projected 
salaries. 
Q. So if we have a person who is retired military, 57 
years old, do you think that has an impact on the figures 
you're stating? 
A. I think that an individual that is 57 years old 
has at least ten years to be in the workforce. Employers 
for the types of jobs that I have listed here are eager to 
accept individuals who have the experience and the education 
that Mr. Cox has and prefer those types of stable workers to 
17 I younger individuals, who may not be as committed to stay 
18 J with a company. 
19 | Q. Are you telling us that this eager -- quote, 
20 "eager" -- attitude still persists with employers, even over 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
21 
22 
23 
24 
the last couple of months? 
A. Well, I think that it still persists. And the 
reason is, over the last six years, Utah has had a deficit 
of skilled and qualified workers to fill the job openings 
25 employers have had, and it has been difficult for employers 
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1 THE WITNESS: And I swear that this document was 
2 I given to me at the deposition, but; maybe no. 
3 | TTHTP P O T T P T rL i U P ; oh}* "" t": i i T: I '" I-" ' i h e i n g 
4 received? 
5 MR. FRIEL: Nn . 
6 THE < VUk'l I » 3 I i 
7 n. i By Mr. Wilde) Mr. Cox, what's Exhibit 32? 
8 I That's the lease. I J D e J :i e e t: I I < t: 1 I e • ] e a = • € 
o ! < "' n i i actually, it says "Guarantee" doesn't it": 
I Yes. 
i i IN i i ii i i i | M i ' s n n , i i . J U : J I : m l . e t c t [ I L i L j d l i > JL I L • M I 
connection with the lease. 
' ! 
1 4 i » j biynatures are on there? 
' A [hat's my signature, and I'd signed her name also, 
16 I MP, WILDE ft \r 
I'hii COURT i Id Lt ie re a d a t e on t h i s g u a r a n t e e ? 
MR. WILDE I h a v e i t - -
rvuu
 \ :oi I K '2 : I I "' • i i i Lddted a £ t : 1:1 le d : >cumer". -: 
t , t h e r e a d a t e ? 
1
 MR. WILDE: No, I don't see a date on Lhe 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT; Okay. And so en F-32, you admit that 
you also have signed Mrs. Cox1," rum*-1, t I'lht? 
THE WITNESS: I'n L i lot sure who this went to, bi it, 
] 56 
yes, I've signed her name to that document. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. FRIEL: And, Your Honor, I'm unsure, as well, 
the purpose of this exhibit? 
THE COURT: Well, I can see it as credibility, 
indicating that on P-31 was the document that he said that 
he used 
another 
how I'm 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
to sign the name of Ms. Cox. And on P-32, now it's 
document that he's saying that he used it. That's 
viewing it. Is that --
MR. FRIEL: As long as I don't guess. 
THE COURT: Very well. So 32 is in. 
(By Mr. Wilde) Mr. Cox, what's Exhibit 33? 
This is addendum to the lease. 
Whose signatures are on Exhibit 33? 
That's my signature. 
Both of them? 
And --
You signed Judy's name there? 
I signed Judy's name too. 
MR. WILDE: Offer 33. 
THE COURT: This is P-33. Any objections? 
MR. FRIEL: No. 
THE COURT: P-33 is also received. 
MR. WILDE: Excuse me for a second, Your Honor. 
(By Mr. Wilde) Mr. Cox, what's Exhibit 34? 
15 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
That's the DD Form 214. 
What's a DD Form 214? 
States at the top Certificate of Release of 
Discharge from Active Duty. 
Q. And, in fact, that's the document that you get at 
the time you leave active duty in which the military 
categorizes and explains all the things you did while you 
were in 
A. 
Q. 
does in 
the military, isn't it? 
That's correct. 
And that's something that the military normally 
the course of its business when it releases people, 
isn't it? I 
A. 
Q. 
it? 
A. 
Q. 
that. 
A. 
That's correct. 
And this is the one that pertains to you, isn't 
That's correct. 
MR. WILDE: Offer 34. 
MR. FRIEL: No objection. 
THE COURT: 34 is in. 
(By Mr. Wilde) And this, in fact -- well, strike 
Mr. Cox, what's Exhibit 35? 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service of the 
income that I made for 1999 for a retirement. 
Q. That's a 1099R, isn't it? 
158 
MR. WILDE: And we object to the exhibit. 
THE COURT: Why? 
MR. WILDE: It's irrelevant. This shows 1979. 
We're dealing with what's happened since he got back from 
the Army and took up with Ms. Armstrong. And we think it's 
irrelevant. 
MR. FRIEL: Our position, Judge, is that it does 
go to his service, his character. Character is at issue, 
and at stake here is believability, integrity, and I think 
it's important. 
THE COURT: The motion to exclude based upon the 
remoteness in time has -- has a lot of appeal to the Court. 
However, much has been said about character and the door has 
been opened by both sides as to the attack on character by 
both sides as to - as to Mr. Cox from Mr. Wilde, and to 
some extent Ms. Cox and Mr. Friel. 
While I agree that it is distant in time, that 
will go to weight and not admissibility. The Court is going 
to allow the bishop's certificate with that admonition, that 
it goes to weight and not admissibility. So it will be 
received. 
So D-62 -- the four previously have been received, 
as well as now the bishop's certificate. The Court, over 
objection, will receive D-62. 
MR. FRIEL: Thank you. 
385 
Q. Mr. Cox, will you turn to Exhibit No. B, please? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, specifically, let's pass the first page and 
let's go to the second page. Can you identify what this 
document is? 
A. This is my entry date into the military. 
Q. And what does that date show? 
A. 2 6 January 1968. 
MR. WILDE: We're going to object to testifying 
from it unless it's marked and offered as an exhibit. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to mark the 
whole document as 63, Mr. Friel? 
MR. FRIEL: That's what I would propose to do, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WILDE: And, excuse me, Your Honor. The whole 
document refers to the military record or to Mr. Cox's 
characterization of it on the front. 
THE COURT: I'm suggesting that all of those --
all four documents be marked in the same and that his 
examination as supporting and as -- as foundation to 
eventually lead to whatever is on the military retirement 
summary page will be then taken care of. 
MR. WILDE: And we would object to that. We don't 
have any problem with the final three documents, but the 
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first page, we think, is argument. 
ways. 
we can 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. FRIEL: Well, Judge, you can't have it both 
Either youfve got to argue from the first forward, or 
argue back. And he's --
THE COURT: Well, we're going to have the military 
retirement package of four pages will be D-63. 
Q. 
A. 
the mil 
Q. 
date? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
please 
MR. FRIEL: Thank you. 
Again, Mr. Cox, second page Exhibit -- let's see-
ls a document showing that the date that I entered 
itary is on 26 January 1968. 
That's right. What was actually the marriage 
17 November 1971. 
17 or 18th of November? 
I think it was 18 November. 
Okay. Thank you. Let's turn to the second page, 
--or pardon me. Actually, the third page of Exhibit 
63. And identify that, please. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
1993. 
Q. 
right? 
That's a DD Form 214. 
And what --
It shows my separation date of being January 31, 
Okay. And that's specifically under 12B; is that 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
12B, January 31, '93? 
Yes. 
All right. And so, for purposes of your 
enlistment and discharge in the Army, those are the two 
dates f] 
i Q* 
Exhibit 
A. 
of year 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
part of 
A. 
Q. 
page of 
here. 
com page 2 and 3 of those Exhibit 64 — 
MR. WILDE: Objection. Foundation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
(By Mr. Friel) Will you turn to the last page of 
63? 
That's the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
2000. 
When did you specifically receive this? 
Towards 2001. This is the last one I've got. 
Okay. And then did you use the figure $3 9,516 as 
your tax records? 
I did. 
Okay. Now, if you will, turn back to the first 
B, Mr. Cox. You've outlined for the Court the date 
If you pass the first paragraph, you entered 
military, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
lines o 
those s< 
I did. 
And then you've got an additional four breakdown--
f breakdown. Why did you break -- break it down into 
equential days? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
dates. 
Q. 
of '68? 
A. 
Q. 
military 
A. 
through 
Q. 
That was by the year and by the date. 
Uh-huh. 
January 26th of 1968 to 31 January 1968 is by 
Right. And then you broke it down from February 1 
To 31 December '68, which is 334 days. 
Right. So you have totaled here service in the 
at 9,130 days, correct? 
That's correct. 
MR. WILDE: Objection. Leading. 
THE COURT: And I understand that, but let's get 
this. So just be mindful of the reading, Mr. Cox. 
MR. FRIEL: All right. 
Would you go ahead, Mr. Cox, and what is the next 
set of numbers that you have here? 
A. 
married. 
Q. 
A. 
the two. 
Q. 
when? 
A. 
Q. 
The next set of numbers is the date that we got 
Uh-huh. 
To the day that I retired. And then I compared 
Okay. And we have the total days married through 
31 January 1993. 
Okay. Date you finished your service. 
389 
A. Retired. 
Q. All right. And those days tallied how many? 
A. 7,741 days. 
Q. All right. And then did you make calculations 
based on those two figures? 
A. I did. 
Q. And what did you come up with? 
A. I came up with percentage of military days that 
respondent and petitioner were married were 84 per cent, 
84.78 per cent. 
Q. Okay. And then did you use the dollar figure on 
the last page 4 of the exhibit as the retirement amount? 
A. I did. 
Q. And that amount was what? 
A. $3,293. 
Q. And that's per month that you receive from --
A. Thatfs correct. 
Q. -- the military. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. Now, that's a gross income figure, correct? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. You're taxed on that? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And then you calculated the respective percentages 
as what? 
390 
A. As 42.39 per cent for petitioner or $1,395.90, and 
$1,897.10 for me. 
Q. Okay. All right. And at this point in time, you 
are receiving the full $3,293 per month, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you are paying $1,500 -- $1,500 per month in a 
child support/alimony combination. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. Let's see, did we offer and get in 63? 
MR. FRIEL: All right. I'd like to offer 63, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: Other than the objections previously 
indicated, Mr. Wilde? 
MR. WILDE: Yes, Your Honor. We object in that 
this merely shows -- the second page merely shows time in 
these various assignments. The third page has absolutely 
nothing on there that indicates it, in any fashion, is 
associated with his retirement. 
And, in fact, if you look at his net active 
service, which is listed on there at 12C, of 24 years, 1 
month and 21 days, you get that number if you subtract 12-
10-68 from 1-31-93. And there is nothing they've produced 
which indicates that the Army is in fact basing his 
retirement on the first date which he indicates, which is 
December 10, '68. 
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MR. FRIEL: Your Honor, the issue is: Is this 
exhibit illustrative of his testimony? If Mr. Wilde wants 
to cross-examine, that's what that argument is and he can go 
after it. 
MR. WILDE: Your Honor, I disagree. The issue is 
not is this illustrative of his testimony, because these are 
documents that were prepared by the Army, these are business 
records from the Army. And if we're going to be talking 
about his retirement, we ought to be looking at a business 
record from the Army in which the Army says, "We're 
calculating Larry Cox's retirement on some particular set of 
numbers or some particular set of dates." And this document 
does not do that. 
And, in fact, it shows on his DB Form 214 that his 
net active service is not the beginning date on the first 
line, which says Enlisted Service; it in fact is the 
beginning date on the second line, which is the beginning of 
his commissioned service. 
And there's nothing before this Court which would 
indicate that his retirement includes that enlisted service. 
And, in fact, the document would indicate that it starts 
with his commissioned service. 
THE COURT: A certificate of release or discharge 
from active duty, someone who has absolutely no experience 
with military documents, doesn't that indicate to me that 
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that's the date that he was discharged from duty? 
MR. FRIEL: Certainly. And he's no longer part of 
the Army. 
MR. WILDE: Right. 
THE COURT: All right. And so if he's no longer 
part of the Army and he's got actual time in, why doesn't 
that begin the -- why isn't that the beginning/ending date 
for his retirement then? 
MR. WILDE: Okay. That's the ending date of his 
service and the beginning date of his retirement. But 
that's not the issue. The issue is whether the additional 
year they're trying to get off the first line of the second 
page is something that's included for his retirement. And 
in fact, the DB Form 214 shows that the beginning of his 
term is December 12th --or pardon me -- December 10, 1968 
and not January 26th, 1968, as they're arguing. 
THE COURT: Well, they -- no, no, no. The date 
entered is 12-10 of '68. 
MR. WILDE: That's correct. And that's the figure 
we ought to be using. 
THE COURT: And so --
MR. WILDE: We ought to be subtracting 12-10 of 
68 
THE COURT: Oh, instead of 26 January '68? 
MR. WILDE: That's right. 
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I THE COURT: All right. Okay. 
now. 
So do you have any --do you 
to Certificate of Release or Discharge 
that document? 
MR. WILDE: No, we don't. 
So 
have 
from 
wait a minute 
any objections 
Active Duty, 
THE COURT: Okay. What you have is, on the 
military retirement part of it, when he's indicated 26 
January '68 he entered military service, that is not the 
same as date entered of 12-68 -- of 12-10-68. 
MR. WILDE: That's exactly right. 
THE COURT: Is that what you're saying? All 
right. 
MR. WILDE: And that gets to, Your Honor, our more 
basic and underlying objection as to having these argument 
documents admitted as exhibits. 
THE COURT: Well, before we get into that, let me 
hear that response then, that your military retirement 
summary on the front page of D-63 did not coincide with the 
records that are there. Mr. Friel. 
MR. FRIEL: We're going off of it, Judge. The 
first -- first enclosure there, and the second, I — I see 
the argument. Mr. Wilde has had these documents in this 
possession for a long period of time. We don't have further 
documentation whether --
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1 MR. COX: Can I -- can I say something? Since I 
2 know, probably, more about this --
3 THE COURT: Well, and that very well may be the 
4 answer to it all, to ask him. But, then, right now I'm 
5 looking at the documents. You've got a -- you've got a 12-
6 10-68 date on the Certificate of Release or Discharge From 
7 Active Duty. As to the record of assignments, you've got a 
8 26 January '68 date. And so we have that discrepancy. 
9 MR. WILDE: We do. And in fact, Mr. Wilde has not 
10 I had these documents in his possession for a long time; 
Mr. Wilde has had the DD Form 214. But when Mr. Cox 
delivered this book last week or the end of the week before, 
13 I that was the first time I'd seen the record of assignments. 
14 J THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WILDE: And, in fact, Mr. Cox is the person 
16 I who has access to the military records people and to the 
17 defense accounting service who could get the underlying 
18 information which show that, and he has not done that. 
19 THE COURT: All right. 
20 MR. FRIEL: Let me follow up with Mr. Cox. 
21 THE COURT: Please do. 
22 I Q. (By Mr. Friel) Mr. Cox, you see the different 
dates on the --
A. I do. 
15 
23 
24 
25 Q. -- third page of the exhibit. 
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A. I do. 
Q. And what is the difference, then, between the 
record of service date entered and the enlisted service 
start date? 
A. Mr. Wilde knows it is the date that I was 
commissioned. 
Q. Which date were you commissioned? 
A. 12-10 of 1968. 
Q. Okay. 
A. The active -- the enlisted time of 26 January 1968 
is computed into my retirement. 
MR. WILDE: Objection. Foundation. 
THE COURT: And while it's an objection as to 
foundation -- and that's sustained. How does he know that, 
Mr. Friel? 
MR. FRIEL: Okay. 
Q. Looking at that first page, it says Enlisted 
Service, January '68, how do you know, Mr. Cox, that that 
is the -- the date of the beginning of the computation for 
the retirement purposes? 
A. By this document, you can't tell. But they do --
MR. WILDE: We're going to object under what "this 
document" is. 
Q. (By Mr. Friel) Page No. 2 or are you at page 3? 
A. Page No. 2 -- or page No. 3. 
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Q. Okay. The Certificate of Release or Discharge 
From Active Duty. Correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
this date 
Yes. 
12A is the date you were commissioned. 
Yes. 
And do you know whether the retirement started on 
or the date of enlisted service? 
MR. WILDE: Objection, leading. 
THE COURT: Well, no. He said "Do you know," and 
that could be answered yes or no. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
you know? 
duty — 
THE WITNESS: They're going to be --
THE COURT: It can be answered yes or no. 
(By Mr. Friel) Do you know? 
Yes, I do. 
Okay. How do you know? 
MR. WILDE: Objection. Foundation. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm after. How do 
THE WITNESS: They pay retirement on -- on active 
MR. WILDE: Objection. Foundation. 
THE WITNESS: -- service, not -- it's not 
separated by whether you're commissioned --
know that 
THE COURT: That's not responsive. How do you j 
is the calculation from January 26th of nineteen 
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ninety --of January 26th of '68? 
THE WITNESS: I don't have a document that says 
that. 
THE COURT: Who has the document? 
THE WITNESS: I imagine the military does. 
THE COURT: Who has control of that document? 
THE WITNESS: Military personnel. 
THE COURT: Who has access to that document? 
THE WITNESS: Military personnel. I -- I don't 
know if I can get it or not. 
THE COURT: You can't get your own document, you 
can't get your own records out of the military? 
THE WITNESS: It takes time, sir. 
THE COURT: Can anyone else access that other than 
you? 
THE WITNESS: They can. They can. 
THE COURT: And I'm accepting Mr. Wilde's 
objections. Do you wish to voir dire, Mr. Wilde? 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILDE: 
Q. Mr. Cox, you've seen your DD Form 214 before, 
haven't you? 
A. I have. 
Q. When was that issued to you? 
A. The day that I retired. 
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Q. Which was? 
A. 1 -- or January 31, 1993. 
Q. Did you read it then? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you have access to your record of assignment 
at the time? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you compare the two documents? 
A. I really didn't. I would think they knew what 
they were doing as far as retirement, and I never really 
looked at it that — 
Q. You were in the Army for how long, Mr. Cox? 
A. Twenty-six years. 
Q. Did you ever run across an occasion when they 
didn't know what they were doing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And did you go back at any time and say to 
anybody in the Army, "You've got me as entering active duty 
12-10-68 and, in fact, I entered January of '68? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you ever ask to have your DD Form 214 
corrected? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Have you ever done anything to obtain the 
underlying documents which would show whether or not they 
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actually are computing your retirement on the beginning of 
1968 versus the end? 
A. No, I did not. 
MR. WILDE: I don't think he's got any basis for 
him to testify as to this, and the documents are certainly 
things that he has within his control and should have 
provided it if he wanted to rely on it. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court is going to 
sustain the objection in part and overrule the objection in 
part. 
The military retirement first page summarization 
will not be received as to D-63. The second, third and 
fourth pages will be received, and it will be received as to 
admissibility and not as -- and it will be -- it'll be 
viewed as to -- as to be competently admissible at this 
time. Whatever weight the Court will put to it will be 
subject to arguments and underlying documents. 
Because of the discrepancy in the dates that are 
on the internal documents, the Court will not allow the 
calculations from 26 January '68 as part of the military 
retirement, but that can be argued to the Court. 
MR. FRIEL: Thank you. 
THE COURT: So 63 is admitted in part and denied 
in part. 
400 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed) 
BY MR. FRIEL: 
Q. Mr. Cox, we will skip Exhibit C. It's already 
been entered. If you'll go with me to Exhibit No. D. Turn 
specifically to the second page of -- second page of D. 
Now, actually, this financial declaration was admitted 
already as well --
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. FRIEL: And the follow-up to that, the 
Verified Petition for Order to Show Cause, that has been 
admitted already. 
THE COURT: Right. Subject to revisions during 
testimony. 
MR. FRIEL: The revisions were on the first 
financial declaration. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Friel) Mr. Cox, turn with me to the last 
page of what you have as Exhibit No. D. Can you identify 
what is written here? 
A. That's my total monthly expenses. 
Q. Did you prepare this personally? 
A. I did. 
Q. When did you prepare this? 
A. About a week, two weeks ago. 
Q. Okay. And did you sign this? 
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